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NOTE
Muddied Waters:
A Review of Joint Venture Jurisprudence in
Missouri
Colin W. Byrd*

I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly four decades ago, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued an
opinion that continues to generate confusion on what constitutes a joint
venture. Johnson v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co. not only distorted the
elements required to establish a joint venture but also provided for the
business organization’s wrongful creation by operation of law through
implication.1 Upon this shaky foundation, corporate law jurisprudence in
Missouri has grappled for decades with the same essential questions of what
constitutes a joint venture and how this species of partnership may come into
existence.
Within the past decade alone, Missouri courts have entertained several
suits brought by plaintiffs relying on the flawed law espoused in Johnson.2
Not only does this expose corporate entities to recurring litigation over the
same or similar issues, but it also provides for uncertainty at the crucial
intersection of law and business in which these entities pursue their economic

*

Colin Westin Byrd: B.A., University of Arkansas, 2018; J.D. Candidate,
University of Missouri School of Law, 2021; Associate Member, Missouri Law
Review, 2019-2020. I am eternally grateful to Professor Thom Lambert for his insight,
guidance, and support in writing this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its
help in the editing process. I would also like to thank my late father, Christopher W.
Byrd, whose example made this Note possible.
1. Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Exp. Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Mo. 1983)
(en banc).
2. See e.g., Bader Farms v. Monsanto Co., 431 F.Supp. 3d 1084, 1093–1096
(E.D. Mo. 2019).; Riley v. A.K. Logistics, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-00069-JAR, 2017 WL
2501138 (E.D. Mo. June 9, 2017); Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., No. 11CV-04321-NKL, 2013 WL 12145822 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 15, 2013); Appellant’s Reply
Brief, Marathon Reprographics, Inc., et al., v. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., 584 S.W.3d 822
(Mo. Ct. App. 2019) (No. WD82392), 2019 WL 2718911, at *8, *12.
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aspirations. It is time for the Supreme Court of Missouri to disavow the faulty
reasoning and bad law for which Johnson stands.
This Note discusses the development of joint venture law within
Missouri jurisprudence. Part II of this Note considers the facts and holding of
Johnson3 within the context of the legal background in which it was decided.
Part III then highlights the trend found in lower courts of ignoring the holding
of Johnson in light of the recent developments in joint venture jurisprudence.
Part IV discusses how the Johnson holding was wrong at the time it was
decided, and how its flawed reasoning has allowed for confusion and
conflicting case law for Missouri courts and litigants. This Note concludes
by illustrating the need for the Supreme Court of Missouri to address the
confusion perpetuated by Johnson and provide the clarification necessary for
entrepreneurs and corporations to conduct business in reliance on firmly
established law once again.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Missouri, it is generally agreed upon that a joint venture is an
association of two or more persons to carry out a single business enterprise
for profit.4 Essentially, a joint venture is a species of partnership that lasts for
a specific duration of time or until the completion of a particular project or
goal.5 Therefore, a joint venture satisfies the traditional elements of a
partnership business organization.6
In analyzing the formation of a joint venture, “there must be a
community of interest in the accomplishment of a common purpose, a mutual

3. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 238.
4. Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5, 14–15 (Mo. 1970) ((quoting
State ex rel. McCrory v. Bland, 197 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Mo. 1946) (en banc)); 46 AM.
JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 1 (2020); Howard v. Winebrenner, 499 S.W.2d 389, 396
(Mo. 1973)).
5. See Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5, 14–15 (Mo. 1970); see
also UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202 (amended 2013) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997). UNIF.
P’SHIP ACT § 202 cmt. b (amended 2013) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997) (citing Jonathan
Woodner Co. v. Laufer, 531 A.2d 280, 285 n.7 (D.C. 1987)) (An arrangement labeled
a ‘joint venture’ is a partnership if the arrangement meets the criteria stated in
Subsection (a). In fact, in many jurisdictions, the law of general partnerships applies
almost without analysis to joint ventures in which the co-venturers share profits.”).
6. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202 (amended 2013) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997).
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), the association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or
not the persons intend to form a partnership.
(b) An association formed under a statute other than this [act], a predecessor statute,
or a comparable statute of another jurisdiction is not a partnership under this [act].
Id.
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right of control, a right to share in the profits and a duty to share in the losses
as may be sustained.”7 Thus, the three elements that constitute a joint venture
are: (1) multiple persons; (2) sharing managerial control or the right of
managerial control; and (3) sharing in the profits and losses of the
organization.8
These three elements, or a variety of the same, were primarily introduced
by Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell,9 and continue to be referenced as
indications of the existence of a joint venture.10 Furthermore, Jeff-Cole
highlighted the fact that Missouri courts were hesitant to imply the existence
of joint ventures where a different arrangement was expressly created.11 This
is especially the case where a joint venture is alleged when a business
organization is in operation for a period of years.12 This was the legal
background at the time Johnson was decided.13
Johnson presented the issue of whether or not two corporate entities
created a joint venture by implication where a freight broker contracted a
shipping entity to transport a load of steel across the country.14 During the
transport, the tractor trailer struck and killed a motorist.15 The establishment
of a joint venture between the two entities would enable the plaintiff to hold

7. Howard, 499 S.W.2d 389, 396 (Mo. 1973) (citing Bell v. Green, 423 S.W.2d
724, 730–31 (Mo. 1968) (en banc)).
8. Id.
9. Jeff-Cole Quarries, 454 S.W.2d at 15–16.
10. See e.g., Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 377,
387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Rosenfeld v. Brooks, 895 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995).
11. Jeff-Cole Quarries, 454 S.W.2d at 16 (“The existence of a different type of
express contract is in itself inconsistent with a claimed relationship of a joint [v]enture
by implication.”). This hesitation on behalf of Missouri courts continues to be the
trend today. See Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., No. 11-CV-04321-NKL,
2013 WL 12145822, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 15, 2013) (“Where an express written
contract between the parties establishes a specific business form, Missouri courts have
been reluctant to imply the existence of a joint venture.”); Marathon Reprographics,
Inc. v. JE Dunn Constr. Co., et al., No. 1616-CV29350, at*3, n.3 (Cir. Court of
Jackson Co., Mo. Dec. 13, 2018) (“The Barfield Court first acknowledged Missouri
Courts were moving away from implying joint venture agreements when corporate
entities were involved.”).
12. Jeff-Cole Quarries, 454 S.W.2d at 16 (citing Morrison v. Caspersen, 323
S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1959)). A defining characteristic of a joint venture is its specified
duration of time, rather than indefinite – i.e., a partnership.
13. Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Exp. Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 239–45 nn.1–21
(Mo. 1983) (en banc).
14. Id. at 238.
15. Id.
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the broker vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver in causing the
accident.16
Thomas Johnson was killed on November 19, 1978, in an automobile
collision with a tractor trailer unit, leased by Tabor, and driven by Brown.17
Johnson’s widow, Cathy, obtained a judgment against Pacific Intermountain
Express Company (“P.I.E.”) and Marlo Transport Corporation (“Marlo”) for
$750,000.18 The defendants appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals,
Southern District, which subsequently affirmed the judgment.19 The case was
transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which heard the case as an
original appeal.20
Tabor owned and leased two tractors which operated with eighteenwheel trailer units.21 Brown and Singleton were employed as drivers of the
tractor trailers.22 None of the three men possessed a common carrier license
for the transportation of freight from the Interstate Commerce Commission
(“ICC”) or any state authority.23 Their operation consisted of picking up a
load of produce on the West Coast and then hauling it to the East Coast.24
After the eastbound produce was delivered, the drivers would look for a
westbound load, which usually involved the leasing of the equipment to a
common carrier possessing ICC authority.25
The load for the fatal trip was arranged by Marlo in its capacity as a
freight broker.26 Marlo did not operate trucks for shipping purposes, nor did
it possess any ICC authority.27 Marlo arranged for a load of steel to be hauled
from Franklin Stainless Corporation in New York to Broken Arrow,
Oklahoma by Brown in the 1978 Kenworth.28 The tractor trailer unit, in
addition to operating without the required ICC authority, carried a load that
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 239.
22. Id.
23. Id. A state issued common carrier license, or certificate, permits the licensee
to transport goods and passengers through intrastate commerce by way of the state’s
public highways. See e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 390.051 (2012).
24. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 239 n.3 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (citing 49 U.S.C. §
303(b)(6) (now 49 U.S.C. § 10526(a)(6)(B) Supp. V 1981)) (providing an exemption
from operating authority for the shipment of agricultural commodities in interstate
commerce).
25. Id. at 239. Leases of this kind are permitted under certain conditions by ICC
regulations. 49 C.F.R. § 1057.4 (1978) (current version at 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 (2018)).
26. Johnson,662 S.W.2d at 240.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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was over the weight limit for several states on the route.29 Consequently, the
drivers selected a route designed specifically to avoid weigh stations.30 There
was no evidence Marlo knew of the overload, selected the desired route, or
knew of the effort to avoid possible involvements with “the law.”31
Prior to embarking on the journey, Marlo paid an advance to the
drivers.32 Marlo was to collect the freight charges from the shipper, or
consignee, and retain a twenty-five percent fee for its brokerage services.33
The remainder of the shipping fee was to be remitted to Tabor for the drivers’
services and use of the 1978 Kenworth.34 However, the freight was never
delivered.35
P.I.E.’s involvement in the case at hand is not significant to the focus of
this Note; however, a brief discussion of P.I.E.’s role is necessary for a more
complete understanding of Johnson’s holding. P.I.E. was a major interstate
carrier of freight at the time of the accident in 1978.36 Singleton and Tabor
testified to several dealings with P.I.E. prior to the accident, in which they
transported cargo under the aforementioned equipment-lease regulatory
scheme.37 While P.I.E. disclaimed any knowledge of any lease or dealings
with Brown, Tabor, or Singleton, a P.I.E. sign was still affixed to the
Kenworth at the time of the accident from a previous shipment.38
Nonetheless, the court, while admitting the evidence was “sketchy,”
stated that the jury, in finding P.I.E. liable for negligence, could have found:
(1) the 1978 Kenworth made its last westbound trip under P.I.E.’s operating
authority ten or twelve days before the accident; (2) it carried signs previously
furnished by P.I.E.; (3) P.I.E. made no effort to collect the signs at the end of
the run; and (4) at least one sign was on the tractor at the time of accident.39
Despite the court’s hypothetical jury findings, there was no evidence that the
fatal trip was made under P.I.E.’s authority or with its knowledge, or that
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. There was no discussion as to the nature of this advance in the opinion.
More specifically, whether this advance was for the drivers’ expenses along the route
(similar to the advance provided by P.I.E.), or if the advance was a portion or the
whole of the payment to the drivers for their services, was never determined.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see 49 C.F.R. § 1057.4 (1978) (current version at 49 C.F.R. § 376.12
(2018)).
38. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 240. Singleton testified that there had been
discussion that the P.I.E. sign might also be helpful in avoiding law enforcement along
the route due to the overload. Id.
39. Id.
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P.I.E. had any interest in the revenues of the shipment.40 Therefore, the
plaintiff’s claim against P.I.E. depended upon a constructive agency theory
derived from the federal statutes and ICC regulations.41
The dispute in Johnson centered on the jury instructions for both Marlo
and P.I.E. concerning their vicarious liability.42 The liability of P.I.E. was
affirmed based upon “statutory policy rather than a conventional respondeat
superior [principal-agent] theory.”43 However, this Note is only concerned
with the liability imposed upon Marlo by the court’s characterization of the
arrangement between Marlo and Tabor-Singleton as a joint venture.
Marlo’s vicarious liability was put forth in “Jury Instruction Number 8:”
Lee Brown, Jr., was operating the Kenworth Truck within the scope
and course of his agency for Marlo Transportation Corporation at the
time of the collision, and
Acts were within the “scope and course of agency” as that phrase is
used in this instruction if:
There were performed by Lee Brown, Jr. to serve the interests of Marlo
Transportation Corporation according to an express or implied
agreement with Marlo Transportation Corporation, and
Marlo Transportation Corporation either controlled or had the right to
control the physical conduct of Lee Brown, Jr.44

Marlo argued that under the arrangement it had no control, or right of
control, over Brown as he headed west in the tractor trailer.45 Instead, Marlo
asserted that it properly retained the proprietor of the tractor trailer, as an
independent contractor, to achieve a particular result but not the method by
which the delivery was accomplished.46 Therefore, Marlo argued there was
no basis for its vicarious liability.47
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 239.
43. Id. at 245.
44. Id. at 241.
45. Id.
46. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (A.M. LAW INST. 1958).
(3) An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do something
for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other’s right to control
with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking. He may or
may not be an agent.
Id.
47. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 241.
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The court first considered the “practicalities of the situation rather than
the legalities.”48 By this reference, the court highlighted the facts used to find
that an implied joint venture existed between the two entities.49 In the typical
practice of a freight broker, Marlo was in touch with a customer who needed
to transport a load of steel.50 Marlo then fulfilled this need by entering into
an arrangement with Brown and Singleton, as lessees of Tabor’s tractor trailer,
to transport the shipment to Oklahoma.51 Marlo and the truckers did not
memorialize their agreement in writing but “rather operated informally.”52
Marlo was tasked with collecting payment from the customer and retained
twenty-five percent for its brokerage services under the agreement.53 The
court’s final “practicality” was that neither party expressed concern about the
lack of operating authority in accordance with ICC regulations.54
Upon returning to the “legalities,” the court concluded that the
arrangement formed by the entities was a joint venture because “the parties
undertook a particular project, for mutual benefit and profit.”55 Without much
analysis, the court hastily concluded, not only that the arrangement
sufficiently satisfied the requisite elements of a joint venture, but also that an
implied joint venture existed between the two corporations.56 Therefore, the
majority affirmed the judgment against Marlo based upon the existence of an
implied joint venture between the corporate defendants.57
Even at the time Johnson was decided, the Supreme Court was divided
over several aspects of the case, including the majority’s finding of a joint
venture between Marlo and Tabor.58 While each of the dissenting judges
disagreed with holding P.I.E. liable, only Judge Welliver dissented in

48. Id. In referring to the practicalities, the court is referring to the conduct of
the parties within the arrangement.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 242.
58. Id. at 246–48. Chief Judge Rendlen and Judges Gunn and Billings concurred
with Judge Blackmar’s opinion for the majority. Judge Higgins concurred in the
portion of the opinion affirming the judgment against Marlo, but dissented in the
affirmance of plaintiffs’ judgment against P.I.E. Judge Donnelly dissented from the
majority’s affirmance against both defendants writing “Today, the [c]ourt ignores
settled Missouri law and implants, again without rationale, a scheme for redistribution
of property.” Id. at 246 (Donnelly, J., dissenting). Finally, Judge Welliver dissented
from the majority in its affirmance of the judgment against both P.I.E. and Marlo.
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affirming the judgment against Marlo.59 His dissent was two-fold, arguing
that the court erred in finding that Marlo and the defendants “undertook a
particular project, for mutual benefit and profit,” and that there was a basis to
conclude that Marlo had an “equal right of control.”60

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The elements that constitute a joint venture are generally agreed upon.
Naturally, there may be some discrepancies in the wording of particular
elements but substantively, the same requirements must be met: (1) multiple
persons (2) who combine their skills and resources, (3) share in managerial
control over the enterprise, and, as a result, (4) share in the profits and losses
of said enterprise.
Joint venture litigation typically concerns two main issues: (1) the
threshold or degree to which the elements of a joint venture are satisfied based
upon the facts and circumstances of any given dispute; and (2) the definition
of terms within these elements. In other words, issues have often centered on
whether both parties possessed sufficient managerial control, or whether the
distribution method between the parties actually constitutes profit sharing.
Either way, both issues must be satisfied and present for an agreement to
constitute a joint venture by law.61
Like partnerships, joint ventures may be express or implied.62 A “joint
venture may be established without any specific formal language to enter into
a joint enterprise; it may be implied or proven by facts and circumstances
showing such enterprise was entered into.”63 However, joint ventures differ
from partnerships in the deference given to the parties’ arrangement if another

59. Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 246–48 (Mo.
1983) (en banc).
60. Id. at 248 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
61. Eads v. Kinstler Agency, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996);
Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1970).
62. Rosenfeld v. Brooks, 895 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); see JeffCole Quarries, 454 S.W.2d at 15; Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., No. 11-CV04321-NKL, 2013 WL 12145822, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 15, 2013) (quoting Scott v.
Kempland, 264 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Mo. 1954)) (“A joint venture may also be ‘implied
and inferred, in whole, or in part, from the acts and conduct of the parties and from
proven facts and circumstances showing that such enterprise was in fact entered
into.’”).
63. Jeff-Cole Quarries, 454 S.W.2d at 15 (citing State ex rel. McCrory v. Bland,
197 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Mo. 1946) (en banc)).
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business organization is created by the express terms of the agreement.64 This
is in part because the parties must intend to form a joint venture.65

A. Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Systems
In Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Systems, the Missouri
Court of Appeals, Eastern District, considered whether a joint venture existed
between two corporations.66 In that case, Mary Jo Ritter, on behalf of a former
patient’s estate, sued the Barnes Jewish Christian Hospital and its parent
corporation for negligent medical care resulting in the patient’s death.67
Building upon the framework set forth in Jeff-Cole68 and Rosenfeld,69 the
Ritter court recognized that the existence of an express contract forming a
different business organization is “in itself inconsistent with a claimed
relationship of a joint venture by implication.”70 Therefore, courts will not
imply the existence of a joint venture where evidence indicates that a different
business organization was created by the parties.71 Moreover, joint ventures
between two corporations must be contractually agreed upon.72 Joint ventures
between corporations are rarely implied, especially when there is an express
agreement to the contrary.

64. “Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 377, 387
(Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Rosenfeld v. Brooks, 895 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995) (“The existence of a different type of express contract is in itself
inconsistent with a claimed relationship of a joint venture by implication.”); Binkley
v. Palmer, 10 S.W.3d 166, 170–71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (declining to imply a joint
venture or partnership where the evidence demonstrated only the existence of a
contract for services, which contained “clear disclaimers” of a joint venture or
partnership relationship).
65. Jeff-Cole, 454 S.W.2d at 16 (emphasis added).
66. Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 377 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1999).
67. Id. at 381.
68. Jeff-Cole, 454 S.W.2d at 16 (“The existence of a different type of express
contract is in itself inconsistent with a claimed relationship of a joint venture by
implication.”).
69. Rosenfeld v. Brooks, 895 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (“[I]t is
inappropriate for a court to imply a joint venture where, as here, it is evident that there
is a different business form involved.”).
70. Ritter, 987 S.W.2d at 387.
71. Id.
72. Jeff-Cole, 454 S.W.2d at 15 (citing State ex rel. McCrory v. Bland, 197
S.W.2d 669, 672 (Mo. 1946) (en banc)) (“[T]here need be no express agreement to
share losses, for if the status is established, such an agreement may be implied; and
also, that a corporation may, by contract, become a part of a joint venture.”).
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B. Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative
In Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri dealt with the notion of an
implied joint venture between two corporations.73 In that case, a putative class
action was brought against Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative and KAMO
Electric Cooperative, among others.74 The class, representing about 3,000
landowners, sued the defendants for misusing electric transmission line
easements.75 The suit alleged that the two cooperatives formed a joint venture
by distributing telecommunications services via the same fiber-optic cable
networks and soliciting customers from the same website.76
In considering the plaintiffs’ allegations, the court recognized that
Missouri courts have been hesitant to imply the existence of a joint venture
between corporations.77 In arguing that Missouri courts have found the
existence of an implied joint venture between corporations, the plaintiffs cited
Hobart-Lee Tie Co. v. Grodsky.78 Hobart held a jury may infer that two
corporations formed a joint venture where one corporation agreed to advance
money to the other and take charge of its clerical work, the corporations shared
equally in the profits, and eventually formed a single corporation.79 However,
in differentiating Hobart from the dispute at hand, the Barfield court pointed
out that the corporations had “an express agreement to act in ways that
mapped on to the elements of a joint venture, such as the right to share profits
and control.”80
Alternatively, the plaintiffs relied on Johnson in arguing that the right to
share profits was not a necessary element in the formation of a joint venture.81
Again, however, the court struck down the plaintiffs’ argument.82 The court
cited Judge Welliver’s dissent in Johnson, and noted that his characterization
of the arrangement formed between the corporate defendants as instructive to
73. Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., No. 11-CV-04321-NKL, 2013 WL
12145822 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 15, 2013).
74. Id. at *1.
75. Id.
76. Id. at *2.
77. Id. at *3; see Morrison v. Caspersen, 323 S.W.2d 697, 701–02 (Mo. 1959);
In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1027 (E.D. Mo. 2009)
(“Corporations may become members of joint ventures only by express agreement or
contract.”); Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 377, 387
(Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Rosenfeld v. Brooks, 895 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
78. Barfield, 2013 WL 12145822, at *3 (citing Hobart-Lee Tie Co. v. Grodsky,
46 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1931)).
79. Id.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id. at *4.
82. Id.
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the case at hand.83 “[T]he majority’s interpretation of the relationship as a
joint venture was not in line with precedent, as the broker earned a fee upon
hiring a driver for his clients, and had no further participation in or control
over the transaction after that point.”84 The Barfield court supported its
conclusion, and Welliver’s dissent, by also citing more recent Missouri cases
holding that the right to share in profits is a necessary element of a joint
venture.85
Ultimately, the Barfield court held that the plaintiffs failed to produce
sufficient evidence of an express agreement between the defendants to form a
joint venture.86 The court concluded that this deficiency in the plaintiffs’
evidence was fatal to their assertion that a joint venture was ever formed
between the defendant corporations.87
Even more recently than Barfield, Missouri courts at several levels have
continued to entertain claims which have relied on Johnson for the proposition
that corporate entities may impliedly form joint ventures through their
“actions” rather than their intentions.88 This is despite the weight given to the
parties’ intent to form a joint venture in joint-venture analyses.89 Moreover,
the facts relied on by the Johnson court in finding an implied joint venture set
a relatively low bar, and rather inaccurate standard, for the satisfaction of the
elements of joint ventures.90

C. Riley v. A.K. Logistics, Inc.
In Riley v. A.K. Logistics, Inc., the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri heard a dispute arising out of a rear-end collision
between a semi-truck and a motorcycle on Interstate Highway 55 in New
83. Id. (citing Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 247–
48 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)).
84. Id. (citing Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 247–
48 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)).
85. Id.;see Jones v. St. Charles Cnty., 181 S.W.3d 197, 202 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005);
Hatch v. V.P. Fair Found., Inc., 990 S.W.2d 126, 138 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding
joint ventures “require[] that the parties have a right to share in the profits and a duty
to share in the losses.”).
86. Barfield, 2013 WL 12145822, at *6.
87. Id. (“At most, the record indicates that Sho-Me and KAMO had a close and
cooperative business relationship.”).
88. Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 662 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1983) (en
banc).
89. See Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1970).
90. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 241–42 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (finding that defendant
corporations impliedly formed a joint venture where one party received a fixed 25%
brokerage fee and had no managerial control after its initial arrangement of the
shipment).
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Madrid County, Missouri.91 The plaintiff alleged that the semi-truck driver
was employed by A.K. Logistics at the time of the accident, and also that the
driver was carrying a shipment for the third-party defendant, C.H. Robinson.92
The plaintiff sought to hold C.H. Robinson liable on several theories,
including joint liability consequential to its status as a joint venturer with A.K.
Logistics.93 The facts and issues of the dispute were very similar to the ones
adjudicated in Johnson.94
The Riley court noted a significant difference between the formation of
agency relationships and the formation of joint ventures.95 In analyzing the
formation of agency relationships, the parties’ intent to form such a
relationship is only one of many factors to be considered. However, “the
parties’ intent to form a joint venture is given significant, if not controlling,
weight in a joint-venture analysis.”96
The defendants argued they were not engaged in a joint venture because
they: (1) did not intend to form a joint venture; (2) did not share a common
pecuniary interest; and (3) did not have equal control or the right to equal
control in managing the enterprise.97 Their denial of a common pecuniary
interest was based on the payment structure of the defendants’ contractual
agreement which was similar to the one between Marlo and Tabor, Singleton,
and Brown in Johnson.98 While the defendants admitted that they each
certainly had a shared economic interest in the enterprise, their chosen
payment structure – a fixed per-delivery fee – did not equate to profit
sharing.99 Additionally, their contractual agreement stated that A.K. Logistics
was an independent contractor and expressly disclaimed the formation of a
joint venture.100
Again, the plaintiff here relied heavily on Johnson in urging the court to
find the characterization of the defendants’ relationship was not controlling.101
To support his argument, the plaintiff contended that the terms of the express
91. Riley v. A.K. Logistics, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-00069-JAR, 2017 WL 2501138,
at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 9, 2017).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.; Johnson, 662 S.W.2d 237.
95. Riley, 2017 WL 2501138, at *8.
96. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5,
16 (Mo. 1970)) (“The existence of a different type of express contract is in itself
inconsistent with a claimed relationship of a joint [v]enture by implication.”); see
Rosenfeld v. Brooks, 895 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
97. Riley, 2017 WL 2501138, at *9.
98. Id.; see Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 241–42.
99. Riley, 2017 WL 2501138, at *9 (A.K. Logistics received a fixed per-delivery
fee for each successful delivery.).
100. Id.
101. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss4/9

12

Byrd: Muddied Waters: A Review of Joint Venture Jurisprudence in Missou

2020]

REVIEW OF JOINT VENTURE JURISPRUDENCE

1125

agreement supported a finding of a joint venture because both parties shared
control over the shipment.102 In essence, because of this “shared control over
the load,” the court, like the Johnson court, should have “implied that a joint
venture existed between the broker and carrier because the entities had
undertaken ‘a particular project, for mutual benefit and profit.’”103
Despite the plaintiff’s reliance on Johnson, the court found that while
A.K. Logistics and C.H. Robinson did share an economic interest, the two
entities did not share profits or control over the enterprise.104 The court
pointed to the fact that A.K. Logistics was not involved in, and had no control
over, the price C.H. Robinson negotiated with its customers.105 In other
words, the benefit to A.K. Logistics was derived from separate, third-party
agreements between C.H. Robinson and its clients.106 Because A.K. Logistics
had no control over the agreements C.H. Robinson entered into, the enterprise
lacked both profit-sharing and mutual control between the defendant
corporations.107 Therefore, the court held as a matter of law that A.K.
Logistics and C.H. Robinson were not engaged in a joint venture.108
A.K. Logistics lack of control over the agreements parallels Tabor’s lack
of control over the agreements entered into by Marlo. As a freight broker,
Marlo sought out shippers to deliver its clients’ cargo.109 Just like C.H.
Robinson, Marlo had an interest in finding a contractor who could transport
the cargo for a reasonably affordable rate so that each entity involved in the
enterprise stood to gain a profit.110

D. Marathon Reprographics, Inc. v. JE Dunn Constr. Co., et al.
More recently, the Jackson County Circuit Court adjudicated a joint
enterprise dispute concerning similar issues.111 In that case, the plaintiff,
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Exp. Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 241–42
(Mo. 1983) (en banc)).
104. Id. at 11.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.; see Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 377,
388 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (“Merely sharing an economic interest is not sufficient to
form a joint venture. There must be some evidence of the parties participating and
having control over the enterprise.”); see also Tuggles v. Thompson, 183 S.W.3d 611,
617 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2006) (all parties having joint and several control over the
enterprise is an indication of joint venture).
108. Id. at 10.
109. Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Exp. Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Mo. 1983).
110. Riley, No. 1:15-CV-00069-JAR. at 241.
111. Marathon Reprographics, Inc. v. JE Dunn Constr. Co., et al., No. 1616CV29350 (Cir. Court of Jackson Co., Mo. Dec. 13, 2018).
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Marathon Reprographics, Inc. (“Marathon”), brought suit against J.E. Dunn
Construction Company (“JE Dunn”) and Site 10.01, Inc. (“Site 10.01”) for
several claims arising out of an alleged joint venture concerning the
development of project management software.112 JE Dunn filed a summary
judgment motion arguing that it and Marathon were not engaged in a joint
venture as a matter of law.113
Marathon argued that all four of the elements from Ritter114 need not be
met in order to establish a joint venture.115 Marathon cited Manley v.
Horton116 for this proposition.117 However, the court refuted Marathon’s
contention by clarifying that the Manley court “was referring to the
evidentiary elements in the case and not to the legally required joint venture
elements.”118 Therefore, the “great weight of case law” requires a plaintiff to
establish all four elements.119 The court declared that Barfield120 was
instructive in the court’s analysis and its holding that “the right to share in
profits is a necessary element of a joint venture.”121 Moreover, because
Missouri courts hold parties must have equal control over the enterprise, a
failure to show joint control is “dispositive of whether a joint venture
exists.”122
In a footnote, the court also highlighted the fact that where an express
written agreement between the parties establishes a specific business
organization, Missouri courts are again hesitant to find the existence of a joint
venture.123 However, similar to Johnson,124 there was no formal written
112. Id. at *1.
113. Id. at *2.
114. Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 377, 387 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1999). See supra Section II for Missouri Joint Venture Elements.
115. Marathon, No. 1616-CV29350 at *3.
116. Manley v. Horton, 414 S.W.2d 254, 260 (Mo. 1967) (“The stated elements
are matters to be considered in [the determination of a joint venture], but they are not
conclusive, jointly or severally.”).
117. Marathon, No. 1616-CV29350 at *3.
118. Id. at *3.
119. Id. ((citing Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d
377, 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)); Eads v. Kinstler Agency, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 289, 292
(Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1996); Howard v. Winebrenner, 499 S.W.2d 389, 396 (Mo. 1973).
120. Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., No. 11-CV-04321-NKL, 2013 WL
12145822, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 15, 2013).
121. Marathon, No. 1616-CV29350 at *3 (quoting Barfield v. Sho-Me Power
Elec. Coop., No. 11-CV-04321-NKL, 2013 WL 12145822, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 15,
2013)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 4 n.4.
124. Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Exp. Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 241–42 (Mo. 1983)
(en banc).
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agreement between the entities, yet Marathon insisted there was evidence of
an express, oral agreement between the entities to form a joint venture.125
Specifically, Marathon contended: (1) JE Dunn would use Marathon’s
software on agreed-upon construction projects in exchange for preferential
pricing; (2) Marathon and JE Dunn would jointly market their IT-collaborated
construction services and use their combined capabilities for their shared
financial benefit; and (3) both entities would have an equal voice in the control
and direction of the partnership.126 To support the establishment of this oral
agreement to form a joint venture, Marathon presented evidence that the
parties had previously discussed creating a joint venture.127
However, the court could find no evidence that the entities intended to
share in profits and losses.128 This finding was partially based on Marathon’s
acknowledgment of testimony, which confirmed the absence of profitsharing.129 Additionally, the court also found no evidence that Marathon had
an “equal voice” in the enterprise because JE Dunn had the sole authority to
decide on which projects to use Marathon’s software.130 Finally, the parties
each conceded that they maintained control over their own employees and
systems.131 Therefore, because Marathon failed to demonstrate that the two
entities shared in profits and losses and also possessed joint and several
control over the project, Marathon’s contention that the parties formed a joint
venture failed as a matter of law.132
Despite the holding in Marathon, confusion remains as to what may
constitute a joint venture in Missouri. Ambiguity as to whether joint ventures
between corporations may be implied further exacerbates this confusion
despite recent cases to the contrary.133 Marathon could just have easily cited
Johnson, instead of Manley, for the proposition that joint ventures between
corporations may be implied, just as the plaintiff did in Riley.134 In the same
vein, Marathon could have also cited Johnson for the proposition that profitsharing is not an essential element in establishing a joint venture like the
plaintiff in Barfield.135 The Marathon court likely would have struck down
125. Marathon, No. 1616-CV29350 at *4.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 5.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 6; see Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d
377, 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
133. See e.g., Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., No. 11-CV-04321-NKL,
2013 WL 12145822, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 15, 2013).
134. Riley v. A.K. Logistics, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-00069-JAR, 2017 WL 2501138,
at *9 (E.D. Mo. June 9, 2017).
135. Barfield, No. 11-CV-04321-NKL at *4.
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these arguments citing the decisions in the respective cases, and profit-sharing
has generally been accepted as a necessary element in a finding of a joint
venture. Regardless, the same issues continue to be litigated and disputed in
Missouri courts.

E. Bader Farms, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.
There is a case, Bader Farms, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., currently before the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri concerning
whether a joint venture was established between defendant corporations in the
development and marketing of certain seeds and herbicides.136 In that case,
Bader Farms, Inc. and Bill Bader are suing Monsanto Co. and BASF
Corporation for the destruction of the plaintiffs’ peach orchard based on
activities arising out of the defendants’ alleged joint venture.137 Despite an
express contractual agreement forming an independent contractor
relationship, which also explicitly disclaimed the establishment of a joint
venture between the corporate defendants, the court has overruled the
defendants’ summary judgment motion disclaiming joint venture.138 In the
same case, an additional issue has been raised regarding whether a duty to
share in the losses of the enterprise is a necessary element in establishing a
joint venture.139 The court held “[t]he requirement of ‘shared losses’ is not a
strict one under Missouri law.”140 Relying on these two issues, the court
overruled defendants’ summary judgment motion “despite the defendants’
stated intention not to form a ‘partnership.’”141
The Barfield court was one of the first to expressly acknowledge that
Missouri courts were moving away from implying joint venture agreements
when corporate entities were involved.142 This trend is further compounded
by courts’ hesitation to imply joint ventures when another business
organization is expressly created.143 Nonetheless, the same arguments
continue to manifest conflicting outcomes.
136. Bader Farms v. Monsanto Co., MDL No. 1:18md2820-SNLJ, at *11 (E.D.
Mo. Dec. 31, 2019).
137. Id. at *1.
138. Id. at 16–17.
139. Id. at 16.
140. Id. (citing Morley v. Square, 2016 WL 1615676, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 22,
2016); compare Hatch v. V.P. Fair Found, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 126, 138 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999) (holding joint ventures “require[] that the parties have a right to share in the
profits and a duty to share in the losses.”).
141. Bader Farms,MDL No. 1:18md2820-SNLJ, at *16..
142. Marathon Reprographics, Inc. v. JE Dunn Constr. Co., et al., No. 1616CV29350, at *3, n3 (Cir. Court of Jackson Co., Mo. Dec. 13, 2018).
143. See e.g., Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 377,
387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Rosenfeld v. Brooks, 895 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo.
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A joint venture remains essentially “an association of two or more
persons to carry out a single business enterprise for profit.”144 However,
recent cases have refined the elements that constitute a joint venture. A joint
venture is established when the following criteria are met: “(1) an express or
implied agreement among members of the association; (2) a common purpose
to be carried out by the members; (3) a community of pecuniary interest in
that purpose; and, (4) each member has an equal voice or an equal right in
determining the direction of the enterprise.”145 The parties must intend to
create a joint venture which may be evidenced by actively participating and
sharing in profits, all parties having joint and several control, and having a
duty to share in losses.146 Furthermore, Missouri courts are hesitant to imply
joint ventures between defendant corporations. The hesitation is exacerbated
when there is an express agreement between the defendant corporations
evidencing the creation of a different business organization or arrangement.

IV. DISCUSSION
Subpart A of this Part discusses the inconsistencies and error in
Johnson’s holding and also the practical significance of its undesired effect.
Next, Subpart B analyzes the importance of distinguishing a joint venture
from a traditional arms-length arrangement and is discussed by focusing on
the legal ramifications of each relationship. Finally, building off of these
relevant distinctions, Subpart C examines the corporate law of Delaware,147
culminating in a solution to help clarify joint venture jurisprudence in
Missouri.

A. Johnson’s Flawed Analysis
The holding in Johnson was incorrect in imposing joint liability upon
Marlo based on a finding of joint venture between it and the truckers. While

Ct. App. 1995) (“The existence of a different type of express contract is in itself
inconsistent with a claimed relationship of a joint venture by implication.”); Jeff-Cole
Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5, 16 (Mo. 1970) (“The existence of a different type
of express contract is in itself inconsistent with a claimed relationship of a joint
[v]enture by implication.”).
144. Ritter, 987 S.W.2d at 387.
145. Id.
146. Id.(citing Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5, 16 (Mo. 1970)).
147. Delaware is considered to be the leading jurisdiction and benchmark in state
corporate law. More than sixty-seven percent of all Fortune 500 companies are
incorporated in Delaware. DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, ANNUAL

REPORT STATISTICS (April
[https://perma.cc/5FH4-95L5].

24,

2020)

https://corp.delaware.gov/stats/
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the Johnson court’s decision to hold P.I.E. liable was a stretch,148 the legacy
of the court’s joint venture analysis, or lack thereof, has inflicted the most
damage by perpetuating confusion surrounding the elements establishing joint
venture in Missouri. Since the decision, Johnson’s faulty reasoning has
continued to find its way into the briefs and arguments of plaintiffs seeking to
hold corporate defendants liable for damages based on findings of joint
ventures.
The Johnson court’s joint venture analysis was flawed for three
reasons.149 It incorrectly held: (1) Marlo’s twenty-five percent brokerage fee
constituted a share in the profits of the enterprise; (2) Marlo exercised
sufficient managerial control over the operation of the enterprise; and (3) the
enterprise constituted an implied joint venture despite the lack of an express
contractual agreement establishing one.150
First, the court did not give any reasons for finding that Marlo’s twentyfive percent brokerage fee satisfied the requisite element of profit sharing.151
The court even enumerated the profit-sharing requirement, yet failed to
sufficiently explain how the element was satisfied.152 Consequently, the
omission opened Johnson’s holding to the interpretation that profit sharing is
not an essential element in establishing a joint venture.153
Second, the court glazed over the facts in finding that Marlo had
exercised sufficient managerial control, or possessed the right of control, over
the enterprise equal to that of Brown, Singleton, and Tabor.154 Later on, the
court contradicted this finding in admitting that “Marlo . . . could not exercise
effective control while the truck was on the highway but, as is usual in joint
ventures, the participants had their assigned roles in the total project.”155
Accordingly, the court reasoned, “No showing of right of control over and
above that which follows as of course from a showing of joint venture need
be made.”156

148. Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Exp. Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 245 (Mo. banc
1983) (“The conclusion we reach is based on statutory policy rather than a
conventional respondeat superior theory.”).
149. See id at 241–42.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., No. 11-CV-04321-NKL, 2013
WL 12145822, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 15, 2013) (where plaintiffs relied on Johnson
for the proposition that the right to share in profits, and subsequently the duty to share
on losses, were not necessary elements in forming a joint venture).
154. Johnson 662 S.W.2d at 241–42.
155. Id. at 242.
156. Id.
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The court used Marlo’s actions as a freight broker, prior to the physical
shipment of the steel, as evidence of its managerial control.157 Because Marlo
was “instrumental in launching and directing the truck journey,” coupled with
the fact that Marlo did not obtain a regular, certified carrier for the shipment
of steel, the court believed Marlo played a sufficient role in the death of
Johnson.158 Therefore, Marlo must be found culpable based upon a theory of
implied joint venture. This non sequitur approach by the court, i.e., culpable
therefore liable, is further exemplified by the court’s focus on refuting Marlo’s
assertion of an independent contractor-employer relationship, rather than
satisfying the elements of a joint venture.159
The court noted that Missouri courts have been hesitant to uphold claims
of immunity based upon independent contractor status.160 The court tried to
couch the establishment of a joint venture, and Marlo’s vicarious liability, in
a “tendency to find that truck operators are agents or servants rather than
independent contractors.”161 This tendency referenced by the court was
exemplified in Madsen v. Lawrence.162 However, the issue in Madsen
concerned whether a dump truck driver was considered an employee or an
independent contractor when he negligently allowed his dump truck to roll
down a hill and strike the minor child.163 The Johnson court conflated the test
in Madsen – master-servant versus independent contractor – with an analysis
for whether a joint venture existed.164
As the only dissent in affirming the judgment against Marlo, Welliver
rightly focused on Marlo’s status as a freight broker and its role in the shipping
industry.165 While recognizing that Marlo had an economic interest in the
delivery of the freight, Welliver pointed out that Marlo had no further legal

157. Id.
158. Id. “Marlo’s case is not helped by the fact that it did not try to place the load
with a regular, certified carrier, having regular routes and published tariffs, but rather
did business with itinerant truckers with no semblance of operating authority.” Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.; see e.g., Madsen v. Lawrence, 366 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Mo. 1963).
161. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 242 ((citing Madsen v. Lawrence, 366 S.W.2d 413,
415 (Mo. 1963)) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new
trial where evidence introduced justified a finding that a driver of a dump truck was a
servant rather than an independent contractor)).
162. Madsen, 366 S.W.2d at 418–19.
163. Id. at 415.
164. See id. Id. (citing Barnes v. Real Silk Hosiery Mills, 108 S.W.2d 58 (Mo.
1937)) (“A servant is a person employed by a master to perform service in his affairs
whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or subject to
the right of control by the master.”); Cf. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 241.
165. Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 247 (Welliver, J., dissenting). A freight broker
places shippers in contact with clients who need products shipped to various locations
throughout the country.
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interest at stake with respect to the fee once Brown agreed to haul the
freight.166 Therefore, because Marlo’s participation in the transaction ended
at this point, the court erred when it found that “[t]he parties undertook a
particular project, for mutual benefit and profit.”167
In finding no basis for the majority’s characterization of the payment
system as a profit-sharing arrangement, Welliver also argued there was no
basis for finding that Marlo had “equal right of control” in the arrangement.168
He pointed to the fact that Marlo could not have controlled the operation of
the truck, even by the exercise of reasonable care.169 Therefore, given the
autonomy with which the driver acted in choosing the desired route, Welliver
was convinced that the driver acted more like an independent contractor.170
The Johnson court seemed inclined to hold Marlo liable for policy
reasons, rather than based upon satisfying the elements which constitute a
joint venture.171 As previously discussed,172 the effects of this inclination
have repeatedly appeared in litigation by plaintiffs relying on Johnson’s
holding to establish an implied joint venture between two corporations on
rather loose evidentiary grounds.

B. Practical Implications of Johnson’s Flawed Analysis
Traditionally, parties to a contract agree on the obligations and expected
performance prior to the execution of the contract. These obligations are
imposed by contractual duty, rather than by law. Very few non-waivable,
contractual duties are imposed by law.173 By leaving these obligations to be
decided by the parties, the law encourages negotiation at the outset of the
contractual agreement. However, as the nature of the relationship changes,
the degree to which the law imposes standards of conduct changes as well.
Joint venture is considered a species of partnership, differing only in the
enterprise’s specified duration.174 As such, joint ventures are subject to the
166. Id. at 248.
167. Id. (quoting Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 241).
168. Id. (quoting Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 241).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 242 (majority opinion) (“This is not a situation in which Marlo
should be allowed to escape liability by asserting independent contractor status.”); Id.
at 248 (Welliver, J., dissenting) (“The result reached by the majority cannot be viewed
as other than basing liability for damages on the depth of the defendant’s pocket
without regard to the degree of the defendant’s fault.”).
172. See supra section III.
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement.”).
174. Stram v. Miller, 663 S.W.2d 269, 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
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rules and fiduciary obligations governing partnerships.175 Among these
fiduciary obligations are a duty of care and a duty of loyalty in the conduct of
business transactions furthering the enterprise.176 The imposition of these
fiduciary obligations stems from the unique relationship participants share
with one another in a joint venture. The elements of joint venture allude to
this point. As joint venturers, each has control over the other’s resources and
a joint interest in the profits of the enterprise.177 Therefore, it makes sense for
the law to impose heightened standards of conduct on a relationship where
one is trusted with the financial assets of another.178 In addition to these
fiduciary duties, each participant is jointly and severally liable for both the
debts and obligations of the enterprise and for any tortious conduct committed
in furtherance of the enterprise.179
The distinction between these two types of relationships has significant
practical implications. By asserting the existence of a joint venture, a plaintiff
is seeking to impose duties and obligations upon the parties that do not exist
in an arms-length contractual relationship.180 Thus, by altering the legal status
of an agreement, a plaintiff may significantly alter the legal consequences and,
subsequently, the legal remedies available to her.181

175. Denny v. Guyton, 40 S.W.2d 562, 572 (Mo. 1931) (en banc) (“[R]ights as
between the adventurers are governed by the same rules that govern partnerships.”);
J. Leo Johnson, Inc. v. Carmer, 156 A.2d 499, 502 (Del. 1959) (“The relationship of
joint adventurers is fiduciary in character and imposes upon all of the participants the
utmost good faith, fairness and honesty in dealing with each other with respect to the
enterprise.”); see also UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 409 (amended 2013) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1997) (“A partner owes to the partnership and the other partners the duties of loyalty
and care stated in subsections (b) and (c).”) (stating partners owe the partnership and
other partners fiduciary duty of loyalty).
176. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“Joint adventurers,
like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the
finest loyalty. . . A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior.”).
177. Unif. P’Ship Act § 409(a), (h) (amended 2013) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1997).
178. Scanwell Freight Express STL, Inc. v. Chan, 162 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Mo.
2005) (en banc) (“A fiduciary relationship is established when one reposes trust and
confidence in another in the handling of certain business affairs.”).
179. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306 (amended 2013) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997)
(“Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c), all partners are liable jointly
and severally for all debts, obligations, and other liabilities of the partnership unless
otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law.”).
180. See, e.g., Birdsong v. Bydalek, 953 S.W.2d 103, 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)
(explaining that fiduciary duty to another party arose out of joint venture).
181. See Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Mo.
1983) (en banc).
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In practice, the establishment of a joint venture, and its corresponding
obligations, provides two primary avenues through which plaintiffs may seek
compensation from corporate defendants. The first is through utilization of
joint and several liability imposed upon the entities by law.182 Through this
avenue, third parties with deeper pockets may be held liable for injuries
sustained by plaintiffs as a result of activities conducted in furtherance of the
joint venture.183 This avenue is illustrated in Johnson184 and A.K. Logistics.185
The second avenue is opened by the heightened fiduciary duties that
participants owe to one another while engaged in a joint venture.186 Instead
of simply owing a duty of good faith and fair dealing in an arms-length
transaction, joint venturers owe to one another fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty in furtherance of the joint venture.187 For example, in a case where a
traditional, arms-length agreement has fallen through, a wronged party may
allege that the agreement actually constituted a joint venture, and therefore
impose fiduciary duties upon the other that had not previously existed. This
avenue was pursued in Marathon.188
Despite this, lower courts have begun to ignore the low standard set in
Johnson for the establishment of a joint venture between defendant
corporations, in favor of the precedent acknowledged in Barfield.189 Even in
the face of this trend, the continued existence of Johnson in Missouri’s
corporate law jurisprudence gives plaintiffs’ lawyers an argument to proffer
in litigation.
In citing Johnson, a plaintiff’s lawyer need simply argue a shared
economic interest in an enterprise between two corporate entities in order to
raise the question of whether the contractual agreement may in fact be a joint
venture.190 Even if the allegation of joint venture is a frivolous one, the

182. UNIF. P’SHIP Act § 306 (amended 2013) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997) (“Except
as otherwise provided . . . all partners are liable jointly and severally for all debts,
obligations, and other liabilities of the partnership unless otherwise agreed by the
claimant or provided by law.
183. See, e.g., Johnson, 662 S.W.2d at 238.
184. See id.
185. See Riley v. A.K. Logistics, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-00069-JAR, 2017 WL
2501138 at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 9, 2017).
186. See Unif. P’Ship Act § 409 (amended 2013) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1997).
187. Id.
188. See Marathon Reprographics, Inc. v. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co., No. 1616CV29350 at *1 (Cir. Court of Jackson Co., Mo. Dec. 13, 2018).
189. Id. at *3 n.3.
190. See Johnson v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Mo.
1983) (en banc).
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question of its existence may be enough to survive a summary judgment
motion and allow costly litigation to continue.191

C. Moving Forward from Johnson
Moving forward, it is pivotal to understand the difference between
sharing in the revenue of an enterprise and sharing in the profits of one in
order to avoid altering the legal status of enterprises. In this context, revenue
refers to all incoming cash flow generated from an enterprise, whereas profit
refers to incoming cash – i.e., revenue – less expenses. Sharing in the profits
of an enterprise imposes a duty on the parties to also share in the losses of the
same, should there be any.192 “Losses,” in this context, may include liability
for any debt obligations incurred by either partner over the duration of the
joint venture, or liability for tortious conduct committed by either partner.
Conversely, sharing in revenue simply imposes a contractual duty to share in
the expected revenue of an enterprise. There is no duty to share in the losses
or satisfy the financial liabilities of the joint venture.193 The existence of either
method of distribution will certainly evidence the existence of a shared
economic interest in an enterprise. However, the ability to distinguish one
form of distribution from the other will clarify the legal status of the
enterprise, and subsequently the duties and liabilities owed by the parties
participating in the enterprise.
This better understanding may be realized through clarification of the
requisite elements of joint venture. From this foundation, courts may be better
equipped to distinguish the difference between arrangements that qualify for
the categorization of joint venture and those that do not; the significance being
the duties the law imposes upon the respective relationships.
Delaware’s corporate law jurisprudence has recognized the significance
of this duty to share in the losses as a requisite element in establishing joint
venture.194 The Delaware Supreme Court laid out a general description of
191. See e.g., Bader Farms v. Monsanto Co., 431 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1093–1096
(E.D. Mo. 2019).
192. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 409(a) (amended 2013) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997)
(“Each partner is entitled to an equal share of the partnership distributions and . . . is
chargeable with a share of the partnership losses in proportion to the partner’s share
of the distributions.”).
193. See Meredith Dev. Co. v. Bennett, 444 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969)
(“It is a general rule that . . . partners and joint venturers impliedly agree to share losses
in the same proportion as profits.”); Binkley v. Palmer, 10 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1999) (distinguishing revenues and profits).
194. Warren v. Goldinger Bros., Inc., 414 A.2d 507 (Del. 1980); N.S.N. Int’l
Indus., N.V. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., No. C.A. 12902, 1994 WL 148271,
at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 1994) (holding that a joint venture, and therefore a fiduciary
relationship, had not been formed where there was no agreement to share in the losses
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joint ventures, similar to the set laid out in Jeff-Cole.195 However, unlike
Missouri, the Delaware Supreme Court has since opted for further
specification of its requisite elements in 1980,196 and in doing so moved away
from a “broad definition of ‘joint venture.’”197 In Delaware today, a joint
venture may be established by the following elements: (1) a community of
interest in the performance of a common purpose; (2) joint control or right of
control; (3) a joint proprietary interest in the subject matter; (4) a right to share
in the profits; and (5) a duty to share in the losses which may be sustained.198
Likewise, several decades ago. the Supreme Court of Missouri set forth
a generalized description of elements that established joint venture.199 Years
later, however, this description of elements was relegated to indicia of the
existence of a joint venture.200 Rather than solidifying their necessity in the
creation of a joint venture, the Supreme Court of Missouri labeled them as
instructive characteristics in a joint venture analysis.201 While this was
insightful, and certainly intended to be helpful in an analysis, the court’s
instructive, rather than binding, list of elements has had the opposite effect on
the development of Missouri’s corporate law jurisprudence.202

of the enterprise); Wah Chang Smelting & Ref. Co. of Am. v. Cleveland Tungsten
Inc., No. Civ. A. 1324-K, 1996 WL 487941, at *5–6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 1996).
195. J. Leo Johnson, Inc. v. Carmer, 156 A.2d 499, 502 (Del. 1959); cf. Jeff-Cole
Quarries, Inc. v. Bell, 454 S.W.2d 5, 16 (Mo. 1970).
196. Warren, 414 A.2d at 509 (quoting Kilgore Seed Co. v. Lewin, 141 So.2d 809,
810–11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962)).
197. Wah Chang, 1996 WL 487941 at *4. (“Twenty-five years after recognizing
a broad definition of ‘joint venture’ in J. Leo Johnson, the Supreme Court explained,
in modified language, the elements of a “joint venture” in
Warren v. Goldfinger Brothers, Inc.. . .”).
198. Sunrise Ventures, LLC v. Rehoboth Canal Ventures, LLC, No. 4119VCS, 2010 WL 975581, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2010) (quoting Warren v. Goldinger
Bros., Inc., 414 A.2d 507, 509 (Del. 1980)).
199. As a general rule, in order to constitute a joint adventure, there must be a
community of interest in the accomplishment of a common purpose, a mutual right of
control, a right to share in the profits and a duty to share in the losses as may be
sustained.” Howard v. Winebrenner, 499 S.W.2d 389, 396 (Mo. 1973) (citing Bell v.
Green, 423 S.W.2d 724, 730–731 (Mo. 1968)).
200. “Indications of a joint venture include: actively participating and sharing in
the profits, all parties having joint and several control, and having a duty to share in
losses.” Ritter v. BJC Barnes Jewish Christian Health Sys., 987 S.W.2d 377, 387 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1999) (citing Jeff-Cole, 454 S.W.2d 15, 16)).
201. Jeff-Cole, 454 S.W.2d at 15.
202. “[I]t appears clear that the ‘shared losses’ factor is not a strict requirement in
Missouri.” Bader Farms v. Monsanto Co., 431 F. Supp. 1084, 1096 (E.D. Mo. 2019)
(citing Morley v. Square, Nos. 4:14-CV-172, 4:10-CV-2243 (Consolidated), 2016 WL
1615676, *at 8 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 22, 2016)).
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To remedy this issue, the Supreme Court of Missouri should recognize
that the following elements constitute a joint venture: (1) a community of
interest in the performance of a common purpose; (2) joint managerial control
or right of control; (3) share in the profits of the enterprise; and (4) a duty to
share in the losses of the same, should there be any. Not only does this list
correspond to those that the court has previously recognized for joint venture,
but the elements fully recognize the characteristics of this particular business
organization and warrant the heightened legal status that goes with it.
Delaware recognized the importance of detailing the elements that
establish joint venture decades ago.203 Moreover, several jurisdictions have
also followed suit in requiring the duty to share losses as an element in
establishing joint venture.204 As a result, Delaware and many other
jurisdictions have avoided, for the most part, the confusion experienced
because of Johnson. It is time for Missouri to do the same.

V. CONCLUSION
Joint ventures are unique entities derived from partnerships and, as a
consequence, the laws which govern them have developed out of partnership
law and through the common law. This development has given rise to the
discrepancies in not only the elements required to form such entities but also
to what degree these elements need be satisfied. This effect is innate to the
nature of the common law system. However, when disputes over the same

203. Wah Chang Smelting & Ref. Co. of Am. v. Cleveland Tungsten Inc., No.
Civ. A. 1324-K, 1996 WL 487941, at *5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 1996). “Although the
definition in J. Leo Johnson states that a joint venture involves a ‘single business
enterprise,’ often joint ventures are highly intricate relationships that consist of ‘more
than just one business transaction’ and often involve the acquisition and operation of
a complex entity.” Id.
204. See, e.g., J.R. Simplot Co. v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. CV 06-141-S-EJL, 2009
WL 564194, *at 8 (D. Idaho Mar. 4, 2009) (holding that the duty to share in losses is
a required element for joint venture) (citing Warren v. Goldinger Bros., Inc., 414 A.2d
507, 509 (Del. 1980)); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 535 (Tex. 2002)
(“[A] joint venture exists “if the persons or entities concerned have . . . (3) an
agreement to share losses. . .”); Radaker v. Scott, 855 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Nev. 1993)
(“A joint venture is a contractual relationship in the nature of an informal partnership
wherein two or more persons conduct some business enterprise, agreeing to share
jointly, or in proportion to capital contributed, in profits and losses.”); Fetter v. Schink,
902 F. Supp. 2d 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“In order to establish a joint venture under
New York law, . . . (5) there must be a provision for the sharing of both profits and
losses.”); Censor v. ASC Techs. of Connecticut, LLC, 900 F. Supp. 2d 181, 201 (D.
Conn. 2012) (“To constitute a joint venture, courts in Connecticut prescribe a five part
test that requires that . . . (5) there must be a provision for sharing of both profits and
losses.”).
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issues continue to be relitigated due to ambiguity in the law, action must be
taken to lift the fog.
Joint ventures formed as a result of the economic interests of the persons
and entities that entered into them. Contrary to this notion, joint ventures are
often used as mechanism for holding those persons or entities liable in tort.
Certainly, one who negligently harms another should be held liable in
remedying that injury. However, when corporations expressly disclaim the
formation of such organizations and then cannot subsequently rely on those
express provisions within the four corners of their agreements, waste occurs.
Clarification of the law establishing and governing joint ventures is
needed to remedy this uncertainty. In turn, this clarification will decrease the
waste by reducing transaction costs associated with the litigation arising from
the ambiguity, thereby promoting efficiency. Corporate entities will no longer
have to guess what the law is, nor will they be forced to relitigate elements
which have been firmly cemented in legal or statutory precedent. The effect
being corporate entities transacting and participating in commerce in greater
volume because of their increased reliance on the legal ramifications of the
business organizations they choose as a means to their economic ends. It is
time for the Supreme Court of Missouri to provide this clarification.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss4/9

26

